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THIRD LORD'S DAY.
Question 8.
Are we then so corrupt that we are wholly incapable of doing any good, and
inclined to all wickedness?
Answer.
Indeed we are, except we are regenerated by the Spirit of God.
EXPOSITION
The question of the freedom of the will, or the power
of the human will to obey God, and to do that which is good, is intimately
connected with the subject of the misery of man, and claims our attention next
in order. It is also necessary to know what ability man possessed before the
fall, and what he has since, that, having a correct knowledge of the effects of
the first sin, we may be the more excited to humility, and to an earnest desire
for divine grace and guidance; and also to true gratitude to God. For this
doctrine of the liberty of the will, brings us to a consideration, not of the
ability and excellence of man, but of his weakness and misery.
The principal question and object, in this
discussion, is, Whether man can now, in the same way in which he separated
himself from God, also return to him by his own strength--accept of the grace
that is offered him by God, and recover for himself the position which has been
lost by sin o? And also, whether the will of man be the chief cause why some are
converted, whilst others continue in sin; and why, both among the converted and
the unconverted, some are better than others? in a word, whether the will of man
be the cause why men do good or evil, whether in this, or in that manner?
The Pelagians, and others of a similar character,
reply to this question, That so much grace is given by God, and left by nature,
to all men, that they can of themselves return to God, and obey him: neither are
we to seek for any other cause than the will of man, as the reason why some
receive and retain, whilst others reject and disregard, divine aid in forsaking
sin, and do, after this or that manner, resolve upon and execute their own
counsels and deeds.
The holy Scriptures, however, teach a
wholly different doctrine, which, as we understand it, is, that no work
acceptable and pleasing to God can be undertaken, and performed by any one,
without regeneration and the special grace of the holy Spirit; neither can there
be any more or less good in the counsels and actions of any man, than God of his
own free grace chooses to produce in them; nor can the will of any creature be
inclined in any other direction than that which seems good to the eternal and
gracious counsel of God. And yet all the actions of the created will, both good
and bad, are performed freely. That this may be the better understood, let us
inquire:
I.
WHAT IS THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL, OR FREE POWER OF CHOICE?
The term freedom, or liberty, sometimes signifies a
relation, power or right, be it the ordering or disposing of a person or thing,
made by the will of a certain person, or by nature, for the purpose of acting
with one's own choice, or from fear according to just laws, or the order which
is in harmony with the nature of man; for the purpose of enjoying those benefits
which are fit and proper for us, without any prohibition and restraint; and for
the purpose of being relieved from enduring the wants and burdens which are not
peculiar to our nature. This may be termed a freedom from bondage and misery,
and is opposed to slavery. So God is most free, because he is bound to no one:
so the Jews and Romans were free, not being bound by foreign governments and
burdens: so a state, or city is free from tyranny and servitude, whilst in the
enjoyment of civil liberty: so we, being justified by faith, are through Christ
freed from the wrath of God, the curse of the law, and the ceremonies instituted
by Moses. But this signification of liberty does not properly belong to this
discussion of the freedom of the will; because it is evident, and admitted by
all, that we are the servants of God, and that the law binds us either to
obedience, or punishment. There are also many things which our will chooses
freely, which it nevertheless has not the power or ability to perform.
Secondly, freedom is opposed to constraint, and is a
quality of the will, or a natural power of an intelligent creature, concurring
with the will; that is, it is the power of choosing or refusing, of its own
accord, and without any constraint, an object presented by the understanding,
the nature of the will remaining the same, and being free to choose this or
that, or to defer any action it may see fit, just as a man may be willing to
walk, or not to walk. This is to act upon mature deliberation, which is the
method of acting peculiar to the will.
This freedom of will belongs to God, angels, and men;
and, when considered in relation to them, is called free power of choice. For
that is said to be free which is endowed with this power, or liberty of willing
or not willing, whilst the power of choice is the will itself, as it follows or
rejects the judgment of the mind in the choice which it makes; for it
comprehends both faculties of the mind, viz: the judgment and the will.
The power of choice is therefore the faculty or power
of willing or not willing, of choosing or rejecting an object presented by the
understanding, of its own accord, and without any constraint. This faculty is
called the power of choice in respect to the mind, which presents objects to the
will, to be chosen or rejected; and it is called free in respect to the will
following voluntarily and of its own accord, without any constraint, the
judgment of the mind. That is called free which is voluntary, and which is
opposed to what is involuntary and constrained, but not to that which is
necessary; for that which is voluntary may agree and harmonize with what is
necessary, but not with what is involuntary, as God and the holy angels are
necessarily good, but not involuntarily or constrainedly; but most freely,
because they have the beginning and cause of their goodness, which is free will,
in themselves. That is said to be constrained which has only an external
beginning and cause of its own activity, and not, at the same time, one that is
also internal, by which it may move itself to act in this or in that manner.
There is, therefore, such a difference between what
is necessary and constrained, as that which exists between what is general and
particular. Whatever is constrained is necessary, but not every thing that is
necessary is constrained. Hence there is what is called a double necessity--a
necessity of immutability and of constraint. The former may exist with what is
voluntary, but the latter cannot.
The same distinction also exists between what is free
and contingent. Every thing that is free is contingent, but not the opposite.
Therefore that which is free is a species of what is contingent, as is also that
which is fortuitous and casual.
There are two things common to God and rational
creatures as it respects the liberty of the will. The one is, that God and
intelligent creatures act upon deliberation and counsel, that is, they choose or
reject objects by the exercise of the understanding and will. The other is, that
they choose or reject objects by their own proper and inward activity, without
any constraint, which is the same thing as to say that the will being in its own
nature capacitated to will the opposite of that which it does will, or to defer
acting, inclines of its own accord to that course which it prefers. (Ps. 104:24;
115:3. Gen. 3:6. Is. 1:19-20. Matt. 23:37.)
There are three differences between the liberty which
belongs to God and that which belongs to his creatures.
The first relates to the understanding. God sees and
understands of himself all things in the most perfect manner, from all eternity,
without the least ignorance or error of judgment. Creatures, on the other hand,
know nothing of themselves, neither do they know all things, nor the same things
at all times; but only so much of God, together with his works and will, as he
is pleased, at particular times, to reveal unto them. Hence they are ignorant of
many things, and often err. The following passages of Scripture confirm this
distinction which we have made in regard to the understanding: "Of that day and
hour knoweth no man, no not the angels of heaven; but my Father only." "He
giveth wisdom unto the wise, and knowledge to theme that know understanding."
"Who hath directed the Spirit of the Lord ?" "Neither is there any creature that
is not manifest in his sight." "He lightneth every man that cometh into the
world." (Matt. 24:36. Dan. 2:21. Is. 40:13. Heb. 4:13. John 1:9.)
The second distinction holds in the will. The will of
God is neither governed by, nor dependent upon, any thing beyond or out of
itself. The wills of angels and men are indeed the causes of their own actions;
yet they are notwithstanding influenced and controlled by the secret counsel and
providence of God, in the choice or rejection of objects, whether immediately by
God, or through certain instrumentalities, he they good or evil, which God sees
fit to employ. It is consequently impossible for them to do any thing contrary
to the eternal and immutable counsel of God. Hence the term rsgoueiov (which
means to be absolutely his own, at his own will, and in his own power), by which
the Greek Theologians express free power of choice, belongs more properly to
God, who is perfectly and absolutely at his own control, not being bound to any
one; whilst the term hekousios (which means voluntary or free) is more correctly
used in relation to creatures, and is thus applied in the following passages of
Scripture: (Phil. 5:14. Heb. 10:26. 1 Pet. 5:2.) The various arguments and
testimonies from the word of God, by which this distinction is established, will
be presented at large when we come to the consideration of the doctrine of the
providence of God.
That God, however, is indeed the first cause of his
counsels, these and similar declarations of his word plainly affirm: "He hath
done whatsoever he hath pleased." "Who doeth according to his own will in the
army of heaven, and among the inhabitants of the earth." (Ps. 115:3. Dan. 4:35.)
That the will and counsels of creatures depend upon the permission and will of
God, may be proven by the following and similar passages of holy writ: "The Lord
shall send his angel before thee," &e "Go and gather the children of Israel
together," &c. "Him being delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge
of God, ye have taken, and by wicked hands have crucified and slain." "But God
hath fulfilled those things," &e. " Herod and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles
and the people of Israel, were gathered together, for to do whatsoever thy hand
and thy counsel determined before to be done." "I know, O Lord, that the way of
man is not in himself; it is not in man that walketh to direct Ins steps." "The
king's heart is in the hand of the Lord." (Gen. 24:7. Ex. 3:16. Acts 2:23; 3:17;
4:27. Jer. 10:23. Prov. 21:1.) The will, therefore, of angels and men, and all
other second causes, are in like manner governed by God, as they are from him,
as their first and chief cause. But the will of God is ruled by none of his
creatures, because as he has no efficient cause out of himself, so he has no
moving or inclining cause; otherwise he would not be God, the first and great
cause of all his works, and creatures would be substituted in the place of God.
God does not constrain and force, but moves and directs the will of his
creatures; in other words, he effectually inclines the will by presenting
objects to the mind, to choose that which the understanding at the time judges
to be good, and to reject what it conceives to be evil.
The third distinction holds in the understanding and
will at the same time. God, as he knows all things unchangeably, so he has also
decreed them from everlasting, and wills unchangeably all things which are done
in as far as they are good, and permits them in as far as they are sins. But as
the notions and judgment which creatures form of things are changeable, so their
wills are also changeable. They will that which before they would not, and
refuse to choose that which they formerly delighted in. And still further, as
all the counsels of God are most good, just and wise, he never disapproves of
them; neither does he correct or change them, as men often do, when they
perceive that they have unwisely decided upon any thing. These declarations of
Scripture are here in point: "God is not a man, that he should lie; neither the
Son of man, that he should repent." "I am the Lord, I change not." "What if God,
willing to show his wrath, and to make his power known, endured with much," &c.
(Num. 23:19. Mal. 3:6. Rom. 9:22.)
Obj. 1. He who cannot change his counsel has no free
will. God cannot change his counsel. Therefore his will is not free. Ans. We
reply to the first proposition of this syllogism by making a distinction: it is
not he who cannot change his purpose that has no liberty of will, but he who
cannot change his counsel, being hindered by some external cause, although he
might wish to change it. But God does not change his counsel, neither can he
change it; not, however, on account of any hinderance arising from some external
cause, nor on account of any imperfection of nature or ability, but because he
does not will, neither can he will a change of his counsel, on account of the
immutable rectitude of his will, in which no error nor any cause of change can
possibly exist.
Obj. 2. That which is governed and ruled by the
unchangeable will of God does not act freely. The will of angels and men acts
freely. Therefore it is not ruled, nor bound in the choice which it makes, by
the unchangeable will of God. Ans. It is necessary here again, in answering the
above objection, to make the following distinction with reference to the major
proposition: He who is so ruled and controlled by the will of God as to act
without any deliberation and choice of his own, does not act freely; but it is
not in this way that God influences the will of angels and men. He presents
objects to the understanding, and through these effectually moves and inclines
the will, so that although they choose that which God wills, they nevertheless
do it from their own deliberation and choice, and therefore act freely. hence
creatures may be said to act freely, not when they disregard every form of
government and restraint, but when they act with deliberation, and when the will
chooses or rejects objects by its own free exercise, even though it may be
excited and controlled by some one else.
Obj. 3. If the will, when God changes it, and
directed it upon other objects, cannot resist, it is wholly passive. But this
involves us in error. Therefore the will cannot be thus influenced and
controlled. Ans. The conclusion here drawn is incorrect, in as much as there is
not a sufficiently full and distinct enumeration in the major proposition of
those exercises and actions of which the will is capable; for it may not only
resist the influence which God brings to bear upon it, but it has the ability
also, by its own proper determination, to obey God, and to assent to the
suggestions and influences of his spirit. In doing this, however, it is not only
passive, but also active, and performs its own actions, although the power of
assenting and obeying is not from itself, but from the grace of the holy Spirit.
Obj. 4. That which resists the will of God is not
governed by it. The will of man opposes and resists God in many things.
Therefore it is not governed by him. Ans. There are here four terms. The major
proposition is true, if it be understood as including both the secret and
revealed will of God; the minor, however, merely expresses the will of God as
expressed or revealed, for the secret decrees of God's will are always ratified
and performed in all, even in those who most violently resist the commandments
of God.
Obj. 5. If all the determinations, including even
those of the wicked, are excited and ruled by the will of God, and if many of
these are sinful, then God seems to he the author of sin. Ans. There is here a
fallacy of accident in the minor proposition, for the determinations of the
wicked are sins, not in as far as they are ordained and proceed from the will of
God (for so far they are good, and agree with the divine law), but in as far as
they are from devils and men, who in acting either do not know the will of God,
or do not perform it with the design that they may thus obey and glorify God.
III.
IS THERE ANY FREEDOM OF THE HUMAN WILL?
That there is in man a certain freedom of will, is
proven: 1. From the fact that man was created in the image of God, of which free
will constituted a part: "Let us make man in our image, after our likeness."
"God made man in the beginning, and left him in the hand of his counsel." (Gen.
1:26. Eccl. 15:14.) 2. From the definition of the freedom which belongs to man;
for man acts upon deliberation, freely knowing, and desiring or rejecting this
or that object. If this definition, now, correspond with the nature of man, the
thing which is expressed and defined by it must also belong to him.
Obj. 1. If man be in the possession of freedom of
will, the doctrine of original sin is overthrown; for it is a contradiction to
say that man is not able to obey God, and to affirm, at the same time, that he
has liberty of will. Ans. There is no real opposition in what is here affirmed,
because since the fall man has liberty of will only in part, and not such as he
had before the fall, nor to the same degree.
Obj. 2. He who has not a will to choose in like
manner the good and the evil, does not possess free-will. But man, since the
fall, has not a will to choose equally the good and the evil. Therefore he does
not possess freedom of will. Ans. We reject the major proposition, because it
contains an incorrect definition of liberty; for, according to it, God himself
does not possess any liberty of will.
Obj. 3. That which is dependent upon another is not
free. Our will is dependent upon another. Therefore it is not free. Ans. We
reply to the major proposition, by making the following distinction: That which
is dependent upon and ruled by another, and not by itself also, is not free. The
will of man, however, is ruled not only by another, but also by itself; for God
influences men in such a manner, that they are not constrained and carried along
involuntarily, but most freely; so that it may be said that they move
themselves. The being or will which is moved only by itself, belongs to God
alone, of whom infinite liberty may more correctly be predicated, than of
creatures. In the mean while, however, it may be suffi cient, as far as it
respects the liberty which belongs to man, to affirm, that whatever he wills, he
wills freely, and by his own proper determination.
Obj. 4. That which is enslaved is not free. Our power
of choice is enslaved since the fall. Therefore it is not free. Ans. The whole
argument is conceded, if by free we understand that which has the power of
choosing that which is good and pleasing to God: for thus far the will is held
in bondage, and can only will and choose that which is evil. "I am carnal, sold
under sin," &c. (Rom. 7:14.) But if by free we understand voluntary, or
deliberative, then the major proposition is false; for it is not the subjection,
but the constraint of the will, that takes away its liberty.
It is still further to be inquired, in the discussion
of this subject, (and this is also necessary, in order that we may arrive at a
proper knowledge of ourselves,) What, and how great, was the liberty of will
which man possessed before the fall? Whether there be any, or none at all, since
the fall? And if any, what is it? Whether it be restored in us; in what manner,
and how far? Wherefore it is evident that the degrees of free-will may be
considered, and distinguished most correctly, according to the fourfold state of
man, viz: as not yet fallen into sin--as fallen--as regenerated--and as
glorified; that is, what kind, and how great, was the freedom of the human will
before the fall? What is this freedom since the fall, and before regeneration?
What is it in those who are regenerated? And what will it be in the life to
come, in a state of glorification?
The first degree of liberty is that which belonged to
man before the fall. This consisted in a mind enlightened with the perfect
knowledge of God, and a will yielding entire obedience to God by its own
voluntary act and inclination; and yet not so confirmed in this knowledge and
obedience, but that it might fall by its own free exercise, if the appearance of
any good were presented for the purpose of deceiving, and effecting a fall--that
is, the will of man was free to choose good and evil, or it might freely choose
the good, but in such a manner that it might also choose the evil: it might
continue to stand in the good, being preserved by God, and it might also incline
and fall over to the evil, if forsaken of God. The former is confirmed by a
consideration of the perfection of the image of God in which man was created.
The latter is evident from the event itself, and from the following testimonies
of Scripture: "God made man upright, but they have sought out many inventions."
"God hath concluded them all in unbelief, that he might have mercy upon all."
(Eccl. 7:29. Rom. 11:32.) In the last passage just quoted, Paul testifies that
God, with profound wisdom, did not place the first man beyond the reach of a
fall; nor did he give him such a measure of grace, that he might not be seduced
by the temptation of the devil, and be persuaded to sin; but he permitted him to
be seduced, and to fall into sin and death, that all those who would be saved
from this general ruin might be saved by his mercy alone. It is also proven by
this plain argument: that if nothing can be done without the eternal and most
wise counsel of God, then surely the fall of our first parents, least of all,
could be excluded therefrom, inasmuch as God had fully determined, from the very
beginning, what he would have done, as regards the human race--the most
important part of the work of creation. <hint>Those things which the wisdom of
man is accustomed to bring forward against what has here been advanced, may be
found in Ursini vol. i. p. 242, &c.</hint>
The second degree of free power of choice is that
which belongs to man as a fallen being, born of corrupt parents, and
unregenerated. In this state the will does indeed act freely, but it is disposed
and inclined only to that which is evil, and can do nothing but sin. And the
reason is, because the fall was followed by a privation of the knowledge of God,
and of all inclinations to obedience; and because this has been succeeded by an
ignorance of, and an aversion to God, from which man cannot he delivered unless
he be regenerated by the Holy Spirit. In short, there is in man, since the fall,
in his unregenerate state, a proneness to choose only that which is evil. In
view of this ignorance and corruption of human nature since the fall, it is
said: " Every thought of man's heart is evil continually." "Can the Ethiopian
change his skin, and the leopard his spots," &c. "Every man from his youth is
given to evil, and their stony hearts cannot become flesh." "We were dead in
trespasses and in sins; and were by nature the children of wrath." "A corrupt
tree cannot bring forth good fruit." "We are not sufficient of ourselves to
think anything as of ourselves." (Gen. 6:5. Jer. 13:23. Syr. 17: 13. Eph. 2:1,
3. Matt. 7:18. 2 Cor. 3:6.) With these explicit testimonies, gathered from the
word of God, every man's experience fully harmonizes:
as may also be said to be true of the sense of
conscience, which declares that we have no liberty and inclination of will to do
that which is good; but in the place of this, a great proneness to do that which
is evil, so long as we are not regenerated; as it is said: "Turn thou me, and I
shall be turned." (Jer. 31:18.) It is, therefore, clearly evident that the love
of God is in no one by nature; and hence no one, in this state, has a propensity
or inclination to serve God.
Obj. 1. There is nothing easier (said Erasmus to
Luther) than to restrain the hand from theft. And still further: Socrates,
Aristides, and many others, performed many excellent things, and were adorned
with many virtues; therefore there was in them, before regeneration, a power of
choice that was free to do that which was good. Ans. This is an imperfect
definition of free power of choice, and of what constitutes a good work; or of
liberty to do that which is good, which is the power of rendering such obedience
as is acceptable to God. This the unregenerate have not. And although they may
refrain from theft, as far as the external act is concerned, yet they are guilty
of it as it respects the desires and tendencies of the heart. And not only so,
but this external propriety itself, of which so much account is made, is to be
attributed to God, who by his providence controls the hearts even of the wicked,
and restrains them from those outbreaks of sin to which they are naturally
inclined. Yet it would be wrong to conclude from this that it is easy for them
to commence that true internal obedience which is pleasing to God. Such
obedience can only be rendered by those who have been regenerated by the Holy
Spirit.
Obj. 2. The works which are prescribed and enjoined
by the law are good. The heathen perform many of these works. Therefore, their
works are good, although they have not been regenerated; and, as a matter of
consequence, they must possess liberty to choose the good. Ans. We reply to this
objection by making the following distinction: The works prescribed and enjoined
by the law are good, considered in themselves; but they become evil, by an
accident, when they are done by those who are not regenerated; because they are
not done in the manner, nor with the design which God requires.
Obj. 3. What God desires us to do, we have the power
of doing. God desires us to do that which contributes to our Well-being.
Therefore, we have the ability, of ourselves, to do that which is good, and
consequently do not need the grace and influence of the Holy Spirit. Ans. There
is in this syllogism, an incorrect chain of reasoning, arising from the
ambiguity of the word desire. In the major, it is used in its ordinary and
proper sense. But in the minor, it is used improperly; for God is here said to
desire, through a figure of speech, by which he is represented as being affected
after the manner of men. Hence, there is a different kind of affirmation in the
major from what there is in the minor. God desires in two respects. First, in
respect to his commandments and invitations. Secondly, in respect to the love
which he cherishes towards his creatures, and the torments of those that perish,
but not in respect to the execution of his justice. Reply. He who invites others
to do that which is good, and rejoice in their well-doing, declares that it is
in their power to do this, and not in the power of him who invites. But God
invites us to do that which is good, and approves of our conduct when we thus
act. Therefore, it is in our power to do the good. Ans. We deny the minor
proposition because it is not sufficient for God to invite. It is also necessary
that our wills consent to do the good, which they will not do unless God incline
them. Obj. 4. If we can do nothing but sin before our regeneration, God seems to punish us unjustly. Ans. He who sins of necessity is punished unjustly, unless he has brought this necessity of sinning upon himself. We are, therefore, justly punished, because we have brought this necessity of sinning upon ourselves, in our first parents, and follow their example by doing the same things. Other objections, which are ordinarily brought forward by the advocates of free-will, may be seen in Ursini vol. i. page 245.
The third degree of free power of choice is that
which belongs to a man as regenerated, but not as yet perfected and glorified.
In this state the will uses its liberty, not only for doing that which is evil,
as is true of man before his regeneration, but here the will does both the good
and the evil in part. It does that which is good, because the holy Spirit, by
his special grace, has renovated the nature of man through the Word of God--has
kindled new light and knowledge in the understanding, and has awakened in the
heart and will such new desires and inclinations, as are in harmony with the
divine law; and because the holy Spirit effectually inclines the will to do
those things which are in accordance with this knowledge, and with these desires
and inclinations. It is in this way that the will recovers both the power of
willing that which is acceptable to God, and the use of this power, so that it
commences to obey God according to these declarations of his word: " The Lord
thy God will circumcise thy heart." "A new heart also will I give you, and a new
spirit will I put within you; and I will take away the stony heart out of your
flesh, and I will give you a heart of flesh." "Where the Spirit of the Lord is,
there is liberty." "Whosoever is born of God doth not commit sin." (Deut. 30:5
Ex. 36:26. 2 Cor. 3:17. 1 John 3:9.) The reasons, on account of which the will
in this third degree chooses and does in part both the good and the evil, are
the following: 1. Because the mind and will of those who are regenerated, are
not fully and perfectly renewed in this life. There are many remains of
depravity which cleave to the best of men, as long as they continue in the
flesh, so that the works which they perform are imperfect, and defiled with sin.
"I know that in me, (that is, in my flesh,) dwelleth no good thing." (Rom.
7:18.) 2. Because those who are regenerated are not always governed by the Holy
Spirit; but are sometimes forsaken of God for a season, that he may thus either
try, or humble them. Yet although they are thus left to themselves for a time,
they do not finally perish, for God, in his own time and way, calls them to
repentance. "Take not thy holy Spirit from me." "O Lord, why hast thou made us
to err from thy ways, and hardened our heart from thy fear. Return, for thy
servant's sake." (Ps. 51:13. Is. 63:17.) In short, after regeneration is begun
in man, there is a proneness to choose partly the good, and partly the evil.
There is a proneness to the good, because the mind and will being illuminated
and changed, begin, in some measure, to be turned to the good, and to commence
new obedience. There is a proneness to the evil, because the saints are only
imperfectly renewed in this life--retain many infirmities and evil desires, on
account of original sin, which still cleaves to them. Hence the good works which
they perform are not perfectly good. Those things which the Anabaptists, and
others of a similar character, are accustomed to bring forward against what is
here said of the imperfection of the holiness and good works of the righteous,
may be seen on the 253th page of the same volume of Ursinus to which we have
before referred, and also in the exposition of the 114th Question of the
Catechism.
The fourth degree of free power of choice, is that
which belongs to man after this life, in a state of glorification; or as
perfectly regenerated. In this state, the will of man will be free to choose
only the good, and not the evil. This will be the highest degree, or the perfect
liberty of the human will, when we shall obey God fully and forever. In this
state we shall not only not sin, but we will abhor it above every thing else;
yea, we shall then no longer be able to sin. In proof of this we may adduce the
following reasons:
First, the perfect knowledge of God will then shine
in the mind, whilst there will be the strongest and most ardent desire of the
will and heart to obey God; so that there will be no room left for ignorance or
doubt, or the least contempt of God. Secondly, in the life to come, the saints
will never be forsaken, but will be constantly and forever ruled by the Holy
Spirit, so that it will not be possible for them to deviate in the smallest
respect from that which is right. Hence it is said: "They are as the angels of
God in heaven." "We shall be like him." (Matt. 22:30. 1 John 3:3.) The good
angels are inclined only to that which is good, because they are good; just as
the bad angels, on the other hand, are inclined only to that which is evil,
because they are evil. But we shall be like the good angels. Our condition will,
therefore, be one of far greater excellence than that of Adam before the fall.
Adam was, indeed, perfectly conformed to God; but he had the power to will both
the good and the evil; and therefore, with all his gifts, he had a certain
infirmity, viz: the possibility to fall from God, and to lose his gifts. He was
changeably good. But we shall not be able to will any thing but the good. Just
as the wicked are inclined and led to do evil only, because they are wicked; so
we shall be inclined to that which is good, and love and choose it alone,
because we shall be unchangeably good. We shall then be so fully established in
righteousness and conformity to God, that it will not be possible for us to fall
from him; yea, it will then be impossible for us to will any thing that is evil,
because we shall be preserved by divine grace in that state of perfect liberty
in which the will will choose the good only. From these things which we have now said in relation to human freedom, it is manifestly a foul slander to say that we take away the liberty of the will. And although those who are renewed and glorified will not be able to will any thing but the good, after their glorification; yet their power of choice will then be free to a much greater extent than it now is; for God, also, cannot will any thing but the good, and yet he possesses perfect freedom of will. So on the other hand, we do not take away the power of choice from the ungodly, or such as are unregenerated, when we affirm that they are not able to will any thing but that which is evil; for they will and choose the evil freely--yea, most freely. Their will is inclined and carried with the greatest impetuosity, to evil only; because they continually retain in their hearts, hatred to God. Hence, all the works which they perform of an external moral character, are evil in the sight of God, as we have already shown in our remarks upon the doctrine of sin. So much concerning the free power of choice which belongs to man.
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