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THE NECESSITY OF KNOWING GOD AND HIS POWER.
Sect. 7.—BUT I will set your
theology before your eyes by a few similitudes.—What if any one, intending to
compose a poem, or an oration, should never think about, nor inquire into his
abilities, what he could do, and what he could not do, nor what the subject
undertaken required; and should utterly disregard that precept of Horace, "What
the shoulders can sustain, and what they must sink under;" but should
precipitately dash upon the undertaking and think thus—I must strive to get the
work done; to inquire whether the learning I have, the eloquence I have, the
force of genius I have, be equal to it, is curious and superfluous:—Or, it any
one, desiring to have a plentiful crop from his land, should not be so curious
as to take the superfluous care of examining the nature of the soil, (as Virgil
curiously and in vain teaches in his Georgics,) but should rush on at once,
thinking of nothing but the work, and plough the seashore, and cast in the seed
wherever the soil was turned up, whether sand or mud:—Or if any one, about to
make war, and desiring a glorious victory, or intending to render any other
service to the state, should not be so curious as to deliberate upon what it was
in his power to do; whether the treasury could furnish money, whether the
soldiers were fit, whether any opportunity offered; and should pay no regard
whatever to that of the historian, "Before you act, there must be deliberation,
and when you have deliberated, speedy execution;" but should rush forward with
his eyes blinded, and his ears stopped, only exclaiming war! war! and should be
determined on the undertaking:—What, I ask you, Erasmus, would you think of such
poets, such husbandmen, such generals, and such heads of affairs? I will add
also that of the Gospel—If any one going to build a tower, sits not down first
and counts the cost, whether he has enough to finish it,—What does Christ say of
such an One? (Luke xiv. 28-32).
Thus you also enjoin us works only. But you forbid us
to examine, weigh, and know, first, our ability, what we can do, and what we
cannot do, as being curious, superfluous, and irreligious. Thus, while with your
over-cautious prudence you pretend to detest temerity, and make a show of
sobriety, you go so far, that you even teach the greatest of all temerity. For,
although the Sophists are rash and mad in reality while they pursue their
curious inquiries, yet their sin is less enormous than yours; for you even teach
and enjoin men to be mad, and to rush on with temerity. And to make your madness
still greater, you persuade us, that this temerity is the most exalted and
Christian piety, sobriety, religious gravity, and even salvation. And you
assert, that if we exercise it not, we are irreligious, curious, and vain:
although you are so great an enemy to assertions. Thus, in steering clear of
Charybdis, you have, with excellent grace, escaped Scylla also. But into this
state you are driven by your confidence in your own talents. You believe, that
you can by your eloquence, so impose upon the understandings of all, that no one
shall discover the design which you secretly hug in your heart, and what you aim
at in all those your pliant writings. But God is not mocked, (Gal. vi. 7,) upon
whom it is not safe to run.
Moreover, had you enjoined us this temerity in
composing poems, in preparing for fruits, in conducting wars or other
undertakings, or in building houses; although it would have been intolerable,
especially in so great a man, yet you might have been deserving of some pardon,
at least from Christians, for they pay no regard to these temporal things. But
when you enjoin Christians themselves to become rash workers, and charge them
not to be curious about what they can do and what they cannot do, in obtaining
eternal salvation; this, evidently, and in reality, is the sin unpardonable. For
while they know not what or how much they can do, they will not know what to do;
and if they know not what to do, they cannot repent when they do wrong; and
impenitence is the unpardonable sin: and to this, does that moderate and
skeptical theology of yours lead us.
Therefore, it is not irreligious, curious, or
superfluous, but essentially wholesome and necessary, for a Christian to know,
whether or not the will does any thing in those things which pertain unto
Salvation. Nay, let me tell you, this is the very hinge upon which our
discussion turns. It is the very heart of our subject. For our object is this:
to inquire what "Free-will" can do, in what it is passive, and how it stands
with reference to the grace of God. If we know nothing of these things, we
shall know nothing whatever of Christian matters, and shall be far behind all
People upon the earth. He that does not feel this, let him confess that he
is no Christian. And he that despises and laughs at it, let him know that he is
the Christian's greatest enemy. For, if I know not how much I can do myself, how
far my ability extends, and what I can do God-wards; I shall be equally
uncertain and ignorant how much God is to do, how far His ability is to extend,
and what He is to do toward me: whereas it is "God that worketh all in all." (1
Cor. xii. 6.) But if I know not the distinction between our working and the
power of God, I know not God Himself. And if I know not God, I cannot worship
Him, praise Him, give Him thanks, nor serve Him; for I shall not know how much I
ought to ascribe unto myself, and how much unto God. It is necessary, therefore,
to hold the most certain distinction, between the power of God and our power,
the working of God and our working, if we would live in His fear.
Hence you see, this point, forms another part of the
whole sum of Christianity; on which depends, and in which is at stake, the
knowledge of ourselves, and the knowledge and glory of God. Wherefore, friend
Erasmus, your calling the knowledge of this point irreligious, curious, and
vain, is not to be borne in you. We owe much to you, but we owe all to the fear
of God. Nay you yourself see, that all our good is to be ascribed unto God, and
you assert that in your Form of Christianity: and in asserting this, you
certainly, at the same time assert also, that the mercy of God alone does all
things, and that our own will does nothing, but is rather acted upon: and so it
must be, otherwise the whole is not ascribed unto God. And yet, immediately
afterwards, you say, that to assert these things, and to know them, is
irreligious, impious, and vain. But at this rate a mind, which is unstable in
itself, and unsettled and inexperienced in the things of godliness, cannot but
talk.
Sect. 8.—ANOTHER part of the sum
of Christianity is, to know, whether God foreknows any thing by contingency, or
whether we do all things from necessity. This part also you make to be
irreligious, curious, and vain, as all the wicked do: the devils , and the
damned also, make it detestable and execrable. And you shew your wisdom in
keeping yourself clear from such questions, wherever you can do it. But however,
you are but a very poor rhetorician and theologian, if you pretend to speak of
"Free-will" without these essential parts of it. I will therefore act as a
whetstone, and though no rhetorician myself, will tell a famed rhetorician what
he ought to do—If, then, Quintilian, purposing to write on Oratory, should say,
"In my judgment, all that superfluous nonsense about invention, arrangement,
elocution, memory, pronunciation, need not be mentioned; it is enough to know,
that Oratory, is the art of speaking well"—would you not laugh at such a writer?
But you act exactly like this: for pretending to write on "Free-will," you first
throw aside, and cast away, the grand substance and all the parts of the subject
on which you undertake to write. Whereas, it is impossible that you should know
what "Free-will" is, unless you know what the human will does, and what God does
or foreknows.
Do not your rhetoricians teach, that he who undertakes
to speak upon any subject, ought first to show, whether the thing exist; and
then, what it is, what its parts are, what is contrary to it, connected with it,
and like unto it, &c.? But you rob that miserable subject in itself, "Free
will," of all these things: and define no one question concerning it, except
this first, viz., whether it exist: and even this with such arguments as we
shall presently see: and so worthless a book on "Free-will" I never saw,
excepting the elegance of the language. The Sophists, in reality, at least argue
upon this point better than you, though those of them who have attempted the
subject of "Free-will," are no rhetoricians; for they define all the questions
connected with it: whether it exists, what it does, and how it stands with
reference to, &c.: although they do not effect what they attempt. In this book,
therefore, I will push you, and the Sophists together, until you shall define to
me the power of "Free-will," and what it can do: and I hope I shall so push you,
(Christ willing) as to make you heartily repent that you ever published your
Diatribe.
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